Risk and Regulatory Calibration: WTO Compliance Review of the U.S. Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Regime by Coglianese, Cary & Sapir, André
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2017 
Risk and Regulatory Calibration: WTO Compliance Review of the 
U.S. Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Regime 
Cary Coglianese 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
André Sapir 
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics 
(ECARES) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Animal Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, 
International Relations Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, 
Law and Politics Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation 
Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Coglianese, Cary and Sapir, André, "Risk and Regulatory Calibration: WTO Compliance Review of the U.S. 
Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Regime" (2017). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1706. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1706 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Risk and Regulatory Calibration:
WTO Compliance Review of the US
Dolphin–Safe Tuna Labeling Regime
CARY COGLIANESE*
University of Pennsylvania Law School
ANDRÉ SAP IR**
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), Bruegel and CEPR
Abstract: In a series of recent disputes arising under the TBT Agreement, the
Appellate Body has interpreted Article 2.1 to provide that discriminatory and
trade-distortive regulation could be permissible if based upon a ‘legitimate
regulatory distinction’. In its recent compliance decision in the US–Tuna II
dispute, the AB reaffirmed its view that regulatory distinctions embedded in the
US dolphin-safe tuna-labeling regime were not legitimate because they were not
sufficiently calibrated to the risks to dolphins associated with different tuna
fishing conditions. This paper analyzes the AB’s application of the notion of risk-
based regulation in the US–Tuna II dispute and finds the AB’s reasoning lacking
in coherence. Although risk analysis and calibration can in principle play useful
roles in TBT cases, the AB needs to provide more explicit and careful guidance to
WTO members and to panels to avoid the kind of ad hoc decision-making
exhibited throughout the US–Tuna II dispute.
We live in a world filled with risk, and risk has come to dominate discourse over a
wide range of domestic and international policy concerns (Beck, 1992; Jasanoff,
1999; Boyd, 2012). Risk obviously underlies multilateral environmental treaties
related to trade,1 and it finds expression in specific trade agreements on the use
of risk assessment to guide domestic policymaking, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(Howse, 2000). Risk has even found its way into general trade law principles.
Article 2.2 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), for
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1 An example would be the Basel Convention on transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes.
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example, calls for trade-restrictive domestic regulations to be necessary to meet one
or more legitimate objectives, such as the protection of human health and safety –
objectives which Article 2.2 explicitly refers to as ‘risks’ that demand ‘assessing’.
In this article, we consider a recent trade dispute resolved principally under
Article 2.1 of the TBT to draw out lessons about the treatment of risk in inter-
national trade law. Although this anti-discrimination provision makes no explicit
mention of risk, we show how risk concepts figured centrally in its application,
as exemplified in one of the most recent WTO Appellate Body (AB) decisions to
examine this provision: its compliance decision in the US–Tuna II dispute.2 This
decision avoided raising many major new questions about issues previously dis-
sected by trade scholars, such as what counts as a ‘technical regulation’ or a
‘like product’ (e.g., Mavroidis, 2013). Instead, it centered on whether a US regula-
tory regime that impactedMexico in adverse and differential ways was nevertheless
justified on the grounds of a ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’. Central to that
determination was the AB’s explicit risk-based approach, focusing on how well
‘calibrated’ the US regime was to the risks of harm to dolphins from tuna
fishing. The AB found that the US measure was not properly calibrated.
The risk-based orientation adopted by the Appellate Body in US–Tuna II was
hardly novel, nor is it necessarily unreasonable in principle. But a closer analysis
of the treatment of risk and regulatory calibration throughout this proceeding sug-
gests a need for more careful and coherent guidance from the Appellate Body in the
future as to the principles that states should follow in calibrating risks and regula-
tory distinctions – and principles that panels should use in adjudicating future
TBT disputes. Although reliance on the construct of risk may make legal and
policy analysis appear more objective and rigorous, we caution that, without
careful articulation of underlying principles, the invocation of risk in the resolution
of disputes about trade discrimination may ironically contribute to ad hoc or
incoherent decision-making.
1. The long legal dispute over dolphin-safe tuna
Trade disputes involving US–dolphin protection laws date back at least to the
1990s.3 Although the earliest disputes centered on US embargoes of tuna and
tuna products caught in ways that could not be shown to be ‘dolphin-safe’, the
most recent series of WTO decisions stem from a US regulatory regime governing
the labeling of tuna and tuna products as dolphin-safe. This US labeling regime is
built upon the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)
2 Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/RW, 20 November 2015 (Compliance
(Art. 21.5)).
3 For a historical account beginning in the 1970s, see Parker (1999).
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(amended in 1997), and includes regulations4 implementing the statute and a deci-
sion of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit arising under the DPCIA.5
These laws, among other things, preclude labeling as dolphin-safe any tuna
caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) through nets that encircle
tuna swimming with dolphins – that is, by ‘setting on’ dolphins.
Mexico initiated a trade action against these regulations in 2008 because most of
its tuna fishing fleet operates within the ETP using methods that encircled tuna
swimming with dolphins. A WTO Panel found in 2011 that the US regulations
did not offend Article 2.1 of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement
but they did violate Article 2.2 by being ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill their legitimate objectives’.6
In 2012, the Appellate Body issued a decision reviewing the original Panel
Report. Although the AB still held for Mexico, it effectively flipped and found
that the US had violated Article 2.1 but not Article 2.2.7 That original AB decision
found that the US labeling requirements were less favorable to Mexico in their dif-
ferential treatment of tuna fished byMexican boats in the ETP compared with tuna
from elsewhere, and it held that the difference did not stem exclusively from a legit-
imate regulatory distinction.
In response, the US Department of Commerce issued a new rule in 2013, modi-
fying its requirements for tuna labeled as dolphin-safe under the DPCIA.8 It is this
rule, and the question of whether it brought the US into compliance with Article
2.1, that lies at the heart of the latest round of WTO decisions that we focus on
in this article. Mexico requested a review of the modifications made by the 2013
rule, arguing that they did not bring the US into compliance with the provisions
of the TBT. The Panel issued a report in April 2015, finding that, even with the
modifications made in 2013, parts of the US regulatory regime remained inconsist-
ent with Article 2.1.
The rule kept in place the provision that ETP tuna caught by setting on dolphins
could never be eligible for dolphin-safe labeling, but it added requirements for tuna
harvested outside the ETP through similar, encirclement methods – so-called purse
4 Dolphin-safe labeling standards, 50 C.F.R. §§ 216.91 and 216.92.
5Earth Island Inst. v.Hogarth, 494 F3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007) (agency decision that purse-seine nets had
no significant adverse impact was arbitrary and capricious because, among other reasons, it was based too
much on policy rather than science).
6 Panel Report,United States –Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, 15 September 2011, para. 7.620 (US–Tuna II (Mexico)). The original Panel
also determined the US regulation did not offend Article 2.4 of the TBT and declined to reach a decision on
GATT claims made by Mexico.
7 Appellate Body Report,United States –Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, 16 May 2012 (US–Tuna II (Mexico)). The AB affirmed the
Panel’s decision on Article 2.4 and made other rulings undergirding its conclusions, such as affirming the
Panel’s treatment of the rules governing a voluntary labeling scheme as a technical regulation under TBT.
8 78 Federal Register 40,997–41,004 (9 July 2013).
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seine fishing methods. Specifically, to be labeled dolphin-safe, tuna caught else-
where would need to contain certification that no dolphins were killed or seriously
injured, just as for tuna caught through any method within the ETP. The rule,
though, also contained new requirements for documentation and verification for
tuna from within the ETP, and it continued to require an independent observer
on boats engaged in tuna fishing in the ETP.
TheWTO compliance Panel found that the additional certification, tracking, and
verification requirements imposed on ETP purse seine fisheries violated Article 2.1,
but that the provision denying eligibility for tuna caught by setting on dolphins did
not.9 In November 2015, the AB reversed the compliance Panel’s decision. It found
that, by making the absence of setting on a precondition for labeling tuna as
dolphin-safe, the US regulations were indeed inconsistent with Article 2.1.
Although the AB also reversed the Panel on the additional certification and tracking
requirements for the ETP purse-seine fisheries, it examined the entirety of the
amended tuna measure and took notice that, despite making regulatory modifica-
tions, the US continues to bar most Mexican tuna from dolphin-safe labeling, while
at least conditionally allowing similar products to be labeled dolphin-safe.10
Significantly, the AB found that the more onerous requirements in the US regula-
tory regime (particularly those for ETP fisheries) did not align with the levels of
risk faced by dolphins in different locales and under different methods for tuna
fishing. Notwithstanding the US regulatory amendments that imposed new restric-
tions on purse seine fishing outside the ETP, the AB concluded that because of a
perceived lack of alignment between the risks to dolphins and regulatory
burdens imposed on Mexican tuna fishers, the US regulatory regime could not be
said to reflect legitimate regulatory distinctions.11
Following the AB’s 21.5 decision, the US Department of Commerce adopted an
interim final rule in March 2016, intended to bring the US regulatory regime into
full compliance with WTO obligations.12 Nothing in the interim rule modifies reg-
ulations on ETP purse seine fisheries, but it effectively combines categories of
fisheries so that the rules on fishing elsewhere are made more consistent with
those for ETP purse seine fisheries. For example, it allows the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) Assistant Administrator to make a determination requir-
ing an on-board observer if another fishery either has ‘a regular and significant
association between tuna and dolphins’ or shows signs of a ‘regular and significant
9 Article 21.5 Panel Report, WT/DS381/RW, 14 April 2015 (Compliance (Art. 21.5)). The Panel also
made findings with respect to claims under GATT, which we do not focus as they tend to track the analysis
under the TBT.
10 After an extended consideration of whether it could permissibly consider different parts of the US
regulatory regime separately, the AB expressed skepticism at the Panel’s approach to segmenting its ana-
lysis rather than considering all components of a regulatory regime as a whole.
11 The AB reversed the Panel’s findings with respect to the GATT provisions based on reasoning
similar to that it applied in assessing TBT Article 2.1.
12 81 Federal Register 15,444–15,449 (23 March 2016).
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dolphin mortality or serious injury’.13 The rule seeks to make clear that any vessel,
using any fishing method, that intentionally deploys fishing gear against dolphins
will be ineligible for dolphin-safe labeling and that all captains must issue certifica-
tions similar to what captains of purse-seine vessels operating within the ETP must
make.14
2. Regulatory distinctions: twisting turns
Even this brief recitation of the disputes over the US tuna fish labeling regulation
should suggest a considerable degree of complexity to both the underlying regula-
tory standards and their analysis under applicable trade law. Although we are most
interested here in the latest round of theWTO dispute settlement process evaluating
the US response to the original AB ruling, we consider the broader treatment of dis-
tinctions in the US regulatory regime over the course of the US–Tuna II dispute to
show how different WTO tribunals have responded to different regulatory distinc-
tions. Our basic argument is that the regulatory regime underlying this dispute
affords ample ammunition for a complainant to argue, and a tribunal to find, a
lack of ‘even-handedness’ because of the plentiful distinctions embedded in the
regulatory regime. In this dispute, several tribunals focused on different distinctions
at different stages in the dispute settlement process and found various distinctions
insufficiently calibrated to the underlying risk to dolphins.
We accept, at least for our discussion here, the basic conclusion that the US acted
in a manner that treated the Mexican fishing industry less favorably – as well as the
legal predicates underlying that conclusion. Others have elsewhere questioned
some of these predicates, such as whether the US measure was a technical regula-
tion or whether the tuna harvested by Mexico constituted a like product to other
tuna (e.g., Mavroidis, 2013). Still other predicates surely merit additional consider-
ation too, such as the compliance Appellate Body’s decision to reexamine the entir-
ety of the US measure again, rather than just asking whether the changes in US law
had adequately responded to the original AB decision (Howse, 2015). For our
present purposes, we accept the AB’s basic analysis of adverse differential
impact, but focus instead on the second step of the AB’s analysis: whether the regu-
latory distinctions in US law might be justified notwithstanding their differential
impact on Mexican fishing operations. This second step was previously articulated
by the AB in US–Clove Cigarettes, namely whether ‘the detrimental impact on
13 Ibid.
14 Under the new rule, ‘captains of all vessels in [ETP large purse seine] fisheries [and large-scale drift-
net fisheries] must certify that, no purse seine net or other fishing gear was intentionally deployed on or used
to encircle dolphins during the fishing trip in which the tuna were caught, and that no dolphins were killed
or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments in which the tuna were caught. This revision
makes clear that tuna does not meet the dolphin-safe standard if it is harvested by vessels that intentionally
deploy fishing gear (regardless of the type) on dolphins’. 81 Federal Register 15,444, 15,446.
Risk and Regulatory Calibration 331
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745616000562
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Pennsylvania Libraries, on 19 Apr 2018 at 14:38:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than
reflects discrimination against the group of imported products’.15
InUS–Tuna II, the original AB analyzed the legitimacy of regulatory distinctions
based on whether they were well-calibrated with the underlying risks to dolphins,
finding that that ‘the United States has not demonstrated that the difference in
labeling conditions … is “calibrated” to the risks to dolphins arising from different
fishing methods in different areas of the ocean’.16 As a result, the AB could not find
that ‘the detrimental impact… onMexican tuna products stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction’ nor that the US regime was ‘even-handed in the
relevant respects’.17
In the latest 21.5 proceeding, the AB again accepted the importance of the same
showing, stating that ‘a panel must carefully scrutinize whether the technical regu-
lation at issue is even-handed in its design, architecture, revealing structure, oper-
ation, and application in the light of the particular circumstances of the case’.18
If the measure ‘is designed or applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination, that distinction cannot be considered
“legitimate”’.19
Throughout the US–Tuna II process, the benchmark for the legitimacy or even-
handedness of the regulatory distinctions in the US regime rested with risk. As the
compliance AB observed:
[B]oth the United States and Mexico advanced arguments relating to the respect-
ive risks to dolphins associated with different methods of fishing inside and
outside the ETP. Mexico sought to establish that tuna fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins have substantial adverse effects and that dolphins face
risks of mortality or serious injury from tuna fishing outside the ETP that are
equal to or greater than those posed to dolphins by fishing within the ETP. For
its part, the United States contended that the changes incorporated into the
amended tuna measure through the 2013 Final Rule responded directly to the
lack of calibration that the Appellate Body found to be responsible for the lack
of even-handedness of the original tuna measure. In making its arguments, the
United States relied on the findings from the original proceedings, as well as add-
itional evidence, to establish that setting on dolphins in the ETP is ‘particularly
harmful’ to dolphins, and that the risks associated with such a tuna fishing
method are greater than those associated with fishing methods that are not dis-
qualified from access to the dolphin-safe label under the amended tuna measure.20
15United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, AB-2012-1 (2012),
para. 215. For recent discussion of the origin, meaning, and some consequences of the legitimate regulatory
distinction test introduced by the AB, see Houston-McMillan (2016).
16 Appellate Body Report, US–Clove Cigarettes, para. 297.
17 Ibid.
18 Appellate Body Report, Compliance (Art. 21.5), para. 7.31.
19 Ibid.
20 Compliance (Art. 21.5), Appellate Body Report, para. 7.112.
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With this foundation, we turn to what distinctions exist within the US tuna labeling
regulatory regime which might plausibly need to be shown to be legitimate, before
turning to the twisting turns taken by the WTO tribunals in evaluating these
distinctions.
2.1 Distinctions in tuna labeling law
All regulatory regimes contain distinctions. That is how regulations or rules operate
(Schauer, 1991). Accordingly, although the US regime governing dolphin-safe
labels is based on a short statute – the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information
Act – and its rather short implementing regulations,21 both are replete with
distinctions.
At a global level, the DPCIA distinguishes between lawful and unlawful tuna
labeling.22 The statute and implementing regulations then make further distinctions
based on: tuna fishing methods and geographic locations for tuna fishing; condi-
tions for eligibility; and requirements for certification for dolphin-safe labeling.
These eligibility conditions and certification requirements are themselves contin-
gent on further distinctions based on fishing methods, geographic locations, and
even the size of fishing vessels. Let us consider each of these distinctions further
so as to understand better how they were assessed by the WTO tribunals.
2.1.1 Tuna fishing methods
The US–Tuna II dispute revolves largely around purse seine fishing, a technique
which involves a boat dropping a net vertically into the water and then encircling
a school of tuna with it, basically wrapping a ‘bubble’ of net around the school, and
then picking up the net with the tuna in it. Other species of fish and marine wildlife
will typically be caught in the nets too – so-called bycatch. Dolphin bycatch can be
more likely to occur in certain parts of the ocean, particularly the ETP, because tuna
for some unknown reason especially like to swarm around dolphins there.
With purse seine fishing, fishers can determine where to ‘set’ or encircle their nets
in different ways. Since tuna like to swim around dolphins in the ETP, an effective
way of finding large tuna there can be to lay or set the net intentionally around a
group of dolphins, which makes the tuna easier to spot and ensures a robust
catch of tuna. However, this setting on dolphins also leads to death, injuries, and
stress to dolphins as they become entangled in the net. Other ways of setting
avoid dolphins, as they rely on logs or ‘fish aggregation devices’ to attract
tuna – or they just involve searching harder for schools of tuna without dolphins
in their midst, as must be done in other parts of the ocean (Table 1).
In addition to purse seine fishing, tuna can be harvested through driftnets, which
are dragged horizontally through the water and pulled by a boat. Driftnets, though,
21 The tribunals also included Hogarth, supra note 5, as part of the measure.
22 16 USC. 1385(d).
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entangle and capture a large volume of bycatch, including dolphins. A variety of
other assorted methods involve dragging or trolling single lines; these, too, can
yield bycatch, sometimes of dolphins too, but generally driftnet fishing and purse
seine fishing by setting on are the ones that result in the most dolphin bycatch.
2.1.2 Geographic locations
The US regulatory regime draws distinctions based on fishing locations: the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP); areas outside the ETP; the high seas; and ‘other
fisheries’. The ETP is defined by the DPCIA to extend westward to 160 degrees lon-
gitude from parts of North and South America. This is significant for the US–Tuna
II (Mexico) dispute for two reasons. First, although scientists do not really know
why, dolphins and tuna show a much greater propensity to swim together in the
ETP than they do elsewhere in the ocean. Second, Mexican fishing operations
have long used purse seining fishing methods in the ETP. Parts of the ETP lie off
some of Mexico’s western coastline; however, nine other countries’ coastlines
abut the ETP and the vast majority of it lies in international waters, where other
countries’ boats can fish.
2.1.3 Certifications
If tuna is to be labeled as dolphin-safe, US regulations call for one or more certifica-
tions, depending on where tuna is harvested and how. One of these certifications is
that dolphins were not intentionally targeted – i.e., no setting on dolphins. The
second is a certification that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in a
haul of tuna. For tuna harvested within the ETP through purse seine methods,
both certifications must be made. At the time of the original AB decision, purse
seine fishing boats outside the ETP only needed certification of no setting on.
2.1.4 Certifiers
Depending on where and how tuna is harvested, those responsible for filing the
necessary certification must be the captain of the vessel, an observer (such as
Table 1. Methods of tuna fishing
1. Purse seine (§1385(d)(1)(B)&(C))
. Dolphin setting (‘Setting on’)
. Log or FAD (Fish Aggregation Device) setting
. School setting
2. Driftnet (§1385(d)(1)(A))
3. Other methods (§1385(d)(1)(D))
. Long line
. Trolling
. Pole & line
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someone who is part of an international dolphin protection program), or both.
Within the ETP, both are required. At the time of the original AB decision, purse
seine fishing boats outside the ETP needed only certification by the captain.
2.1.5 Findings
US law distinguishes between various kinds of findings the Secretary of Commerce
can make about particular fisheries, with regulatory implications hinging on
whether a finding is made or not. For example, if the Secretary makes a finding
that dolphins in the ETP no longer suffer a ‘significant adverse impact’ from
tuna fishing, then purse seine fishing boats would no longer need to certify that
there was no setting on to be able to label their tuna as dolphin safe.23 If the
Secretary finds a ‘regular and significant association’ between dolphins and tuna
swimming together in an area outside the ETP, then purse seine vessels need to
certify both ‘no setting on’ and ‘no killing or serious injury’. The same is true
for non-purse seine methods in another location, provided the Secretary makes a
finding of no ‘regular and significant mortality’ of dolphins in that location. It
should be noted that no such authoritative findings yet have been made – so the
current structure merely provides for these findings as possibilities.
2.1.6 Size of purse seine fishing vessels
The DPCIA places labeling conditions on ‘a vessel using a purse seine net’ within
the ETP.24 By contrast, US implementing regulations have, from the earliest
days, only applied the ETP purse seine conditions to vessels with a carrying cap-
acity larger than 400 short tons (363 metric tons). The original Panel acknowl-
edged that no conditions whatsoever applied within the ETP to smaller vessels.25
The way the regulations are written, the lack of any conditions placed on small
boats means that any tuna they catch, by any methods, even if dolphins are
killed in the process, can be labeled as dolphin-safe without offending the
DPCIA. The original AB decision made no mention of this distinction. The compli-
ance Panel did pick up on it briefly, implying that the US regulatory change in 2013
had closed up this proverbial loophole. But, in fact, the regulatory change made by
the US did not alter any language related to the size of the ETP purse seine vessel.
Upon questioning by the Panel, the US did offer an understanding that smaller
vessels would be treated in a manner parallel to purse seine vessels in non-ETP
waters, an understanding accepted by both the Panel and the AB but not grounded
in any regulatory language.
23 The Secretary had made such a finding prior to the initiation of this dispute settlement proceeding,
but the Ninth Circuit had set it aside as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Hogarth, supra note 5.
24 16 USC. 1385(d)(1)(C).
25 Panel Report, US–Tuna II (Mexico), table at pp. 7–8.
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2.2 Twisting turns in US–Tuna II
This overview of the US–dolphin-safe regulatory regime reveals six potential dis-
tinctions – and sub-distinctions within them – that could potentially be scrutinized
for legitimacy or even-handedness. Some of these distinctions – but by no means
all – have figured into the WTO tribunals’ analyses. In fact, at each major step
along the dispute settlement process, the central distinction of concern to the tribu-
nal has shifted, with new distinctions of concern emerging along the way. The treat-
ment of regulatory distinctions throughout the US–Tuna II proceedings appears to
have been ad hoc, if not opportunistic. This may be a sign, of course, of successful
lawyering on behalf of claimants seeking to take another bite at the apple each time;
however, it also evinces an apparent lack of a firm, principled foundation upon
which to determine what distinctions matter and what needs to be shown to dem-
onstrate that the relevant distinctions are sufficiently calibrated and legitimate.
Although the original Panel quite explicitly focused only on the distinction
between purse seine fishing with and without dolphin-setting, the original AB
went in a new direction by focusing on the difference in the required certification
that dolphins were not killed or seriously injured between ETP and non-ETP
purse seine fishing. After the US removed the latter distinction through a regulatory
change, the Article 21.5 AB shifted yet again to another distinction, this time in who
must certify: captains and observers or captains only, as between ETP versus non-
ETP purse seine fishing, respectively. As Howse (2015) has suggested, ‘it is truly
difficult to fathom the AB’s reasoning’ in its 21.5 decision. Let us consider the twist-
ing path that led to this latest decision.
2.2.1 Original Panel
The original Panel recognized that ‘the US dolphin-safe labeling provisions involve
a number of regulatory distinctions’.26 But it focused on ‘[t]he regulatory distinc-
tions at issue’ as those involving ‘setting on dolphins as opposed to not setting
on dolphins’.27 This limited focus on ‘setting on’ versus ‘not-setting on’ was
surely a function of what the parties had argued, which in turn was no doubt
affected by the fact that ‘at least two thirds of Mexico’s purse seine tuna fleet
fishes in the ETP by setting on’.28 By contrast, most US fishing operators no
longer use setting on techniques.29 The Panel concluded that the measures did
not violate Article 2.1 because anyone could choose to adopt a method of tuna
fishing that did not involve setting on dolphins. (In fact, not only have US fishing
operators abandoned the practice in the ETP, but also an influx of fishing boats
from Ecuador has entered the ETP in the years following the DPCIA, which do
26 Panel Report, US–Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.304.
27 Ibid., p. 186.
28 Ibid., para. 7.314.
29 Ibid., para. 7.316.
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not use the technique.) The Panel did acknowledge that ‘the measures at issue
involve further distinctions, in particular in the certification requirements for differ-
ent areas, depending on the status of the fishery, the type of vessel[,] and fishing
method used’.30 However, the Panel did not consider any of those other distinc-
tions for the purpose of its Article 2.1 analysis: ‘Mexico has indicated that these
differences in treatment are not the factual basis for its discrimination claims. We
therefore do not address them in this context.’31 Some of those other distinctions
were addressed by the Panel in another context, namely its treatment of Article
2.2, where it did find the US had acted inconsistently with WTO obligations.
2.2.2 Original AB
When the AB undertook its review of the Panel’s decision, it flipped ultimate con-
clusions, finding the US violated Article 2.1 but not Article 2.2. Significantly, setting
versus not-setting was no longer the only distinction Mexico advanced in support
of its claim under Article 2.1. Rather, Mexico emphasized that its fishing operations
within the ETP, in order to comply with the dolphin protection program under the
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP), already
had on-board observers to certify that dolphins were not killed or seriously injured,
something also required by US law (in addition to no setting on) for purse seine
fishing in the ETP. By contrast, similar purse seine fishing operations outside the
ETP did not need to have anyone certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously
injured in order to qualify for the US–dolphin-safe label, only that no setting on
occurred.
The AB relied on much of the Panel’s Article 2.2 findings to bolster its conclusion
that the US had violated Article 2.1. The AB concluded that the US regulatory
regime discriminated against Mexico, and when it turned to consider the possibility
of a legitimate regulatory distinction, the distinction was no longer setting on versus
no setting on, but instead certification versus no certification of an absence of
dolphin kills and serious dolphin injuries. The AB asked ‘whether the detrimental
impact of the measure stems exclusively from such a [legitimate] distinction rather
than reflecting discrimination’.32
The AB pointed to uncontested Panel findings that dolphin killings do occur with
fishing outside the ETP, whether through purse seine fishing or other fishing
methods. The Panel had found that the volume of dolphin bycatch outside the
ETP was ‘significant’, while the US argued that the level outside the ETP was
vastly lower than within the ETP, claiming that the Panel mistakenly lumped
together studies of non-ETP driftnet fishing with those of purse seine fishing and
other techniques. (Since driftnet fishing is categorically precluded from the
30 Ibid., para. 7.309.
31 Ibid.
32 Appellate Body Report, US–Tuna II (Mexico), para. 284.
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dolphin-safe label, the US argued that those data are irrelevant to the dispute with
Mexico.) The AB rejected the US’s reasonable concerns and relied on the Panel’s
finding (again, under its Article 2.2 analysis) that the risks to dolphins from
fishing outside the ETP are ‘at least equivalent’ to those dolphins face from purse
seine fishing inside the ETP. These findings told the AB that the US regulatory
regime was not ‘even-handed’ or ‘calibrated’.
2.2.3 Article 21.5 AB
After the US amended its regulations to state that tuna harvested in any fishery
outside the ETP would be required to be accompanied by a ‘no killing’ certification,
the compliance AB agreed with the compliance Panel that, in making this change,
the US had eliminated the problem with that particular distinction. If certification
were the only issue, the AB recognized it would have needed to find that the US had
satisfied the even-handedness test and would be in compliance with Article 2.1.33
However, the AB determined that, in its Article 21.5 review, it should reconsider
the entire regulatory profile with this change. In particular, the test should be
whether the ‘differences in the relative risks of harm to dolphins from different
fishing techniques in different areas of the oceans explain or justify the differences
in the certification requirements and the tracking and verification requirements
applied inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery’.34 No longer was
the distinction just one between setting on dolphins versus no setting on, nor
between a ‘no killing’ certification in the ETP but not outside it. Now the US
needed to find differences in ‘relative risks’ from the different fishing methods
and different locations, and then use that risk assessment to justify all the differ-
ences in its regulatory regime. Howse (2015) raises a valid question as to why
this comprehensive risk accounting had not been viewed as the test before. All
that the Article 21.5 AB could muster, apparently, was to say that ‘the question
as to the relative risk profiles … has become more acute’.35 Despite the apparent
increase in acuteness, the AB found that the totality of the risk evidence presented
before the Panel was either contested or incomplete. Consequently, the Panel had
been unable to ‘gauge properly the overall relative risks or levels of harm to dol-
phins… in order to assess whether the differences in the dolphin-safe labeling con-
ditions under the amended tuna measure are appropriately tailored to, and
commensurate with, those respective risks’.36
However, that absence of risk evidence did not stop the AB from proceeding to
rely on risk and regulatory calibration to find the US still to be out of compliance.
Despite its emphasis on the need for relative risk profiles, the AB satisfied itself that
33 Appellate Body Report, Compliance (Art. 21.5), paras. 7.241–7.242.
34 Ibid., para. 7.229.
35 Appellate Body Report, Compliance (Art. 21.5), para. 7.251.
36 Ibid., para. 7.252.
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it could proceed on the basis of ‘other features’ of the regulatory regime ‘that are
not dependent on an assessment of the relative risks associated with different
fishing methods in different areas of the oceans’.37 It called attention to a difference
in the wording of the US law about possible findings the Secretary of Commerce
could make to require that both a captain and an observer, and not just a
captain, certify to ‘no setting on’ and ‘no killing’. For non-ETP purse seine
fishing, the finding that would trigger the observer requirement would need to be
one of ‘regular and significant association’ of dolphins and tuna, while, for
non-ETP non-purse seine fishing, the trigger would be ‘regular and significant
mortality’. The AB rejected the US position that mortality follows directly from
association with purse seine fishing. The AB wanted to see a ‘comparable regula-
tion of a risk scenario’ in which mortality was found directly in both settings –
not using a proxy (association) in one but not the other.38 As a result, the US reg-
ulations ‘do not provide for the substantive conditions of access to the dolphin-safe
label… in all circumstances of comparably high risks’.39 The AB concluded ‘it has
not been demonstrated that the differences in the dolphin-safe labeling conditions
under the amended tuna measure are calibrated to, or commensurate with, the risks
to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas of the
oceans’.40 Despite language about ‘comparably high risks’, the Article 21.5
Appellate Body’s reasoning was all based on logical categories without any empir-
ical risk assessment data, which the AB acknowledged the Panel had failed to
obtain.
2.3 Roads not taken
Just as magicians pull rabbits out of hats, over the course of the US–Tuna II pro-
ceedings, adjudicators kept pulling new distinctions out of the US regulatory
regime. It was almost as if no good distinction could go to waste. Yet, despite
what might look like a certain kind of eagerness to find new regulatory distinctions
around each bend, there are at least two obvious distinctions that never emerged as
instrumental in the dispute. These roads not taken in the WTO proceeding can
reveal something important about the challenge of principled adjudication of
even-handedness. Just as concerns about the WTO process arise from the twisting
turns in the distinctions that did become central to the tribunals’ Article 2.1 ana-
lysis, distinctions that were not examined also reveal a degree of incoherence to
the WTO’s invocations and analyses of regulatory distinctions. Why some distinc-
tions and not others?
37 Ibid., para. 7.254.
38 Ibid., para. 7.259.
39 Ibid., para. 7.266.
40 Ibid.
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2.3.1 Driftnet fishing
Especially if risk is supposed to be the lodestar, it is surprising that driftnet fishing
did figure prominently anywhere in the dispute. The original AB did refer, in
passing, to how the DPCIA says that the dolphin-safe label is not available for
tuna caught ‘on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing’.41 But there
is no corresponding provision in the statute for driftnet fishing not on the high
seas. As the original AB stated, ‘[w]e note that while the measure at issue stipulates
that tuna caught using driftnets on the high seas is not eligible for a “dolphin-safe”
label, it grants access to the label to tuna products containing tuna caught with
driftnets in exclusive economic zones’.42 Mavroidis (2013) has perceptively
noticed this fleeting reference in the original AB decision, pointing out that ‘it
allowed tuna caught with driftnets in its EEZ (exclusive economic zone) to be
called “dolphin-safe” although most serious threats for dolphins occur in coastal
areas, i.e., within EEZ’.
Such a regulatory distinction for driftnet fishing – prohibited on the high seas,
while permitted in the EEZ – would seem completely unjustifiable on the basis
of risk, given both how destructive driftnet fishing is to marine mammals in
general and within the EEZ in particular. One would reasonably think that this
disparity should surely have proven devastating to the US case. And yet,
perhaps because the heart of the US–Tuna II (Mexico) dispute centered on
purse seine fishing, it received only fleeting attention – attention given only in
the course of dismissing US claims that the original Panel erred in referring to
studies that included data on driftnet fishing. Perhaps because it was just a
passing reference, the AB did not recognize that, even though the US statute
limits the driftnet prohibition to the high seas, the corresponding regulations
implementing the statute make no such limitation. Even at the time of the AB’s
decision, the regulations clearly applied simply to any ‘vessel engaged in large-
scale driftnet fishing’ – period.43
The point here is mainly to indicate another instance of the seeming ad hoc
nature of the treatment of risk and regulatory distinctions, not to dwell on the
AB’s error in characterizing US law on driftnet fishing. The point is that this was
a clear road not taken. What is surprising is that, given the original AB’s (errone-
ous) understanding of US law as well as both ABs’ emphasis on consistency in the
treatment of risk, none of the panels ever focused on this distinction.
41 16 USC. § 1385(d)(1)(A).
42 Appellate Body Report, US–Tuna II (Mexico), para. 270.
43 50 C.F.R. §216.91(a)(3). This language was in effect at the time of the AB’s decision, and even in the
most recent reorganization of the CFR provisions effectuated by theMarch 2016 interim rule, this language
remains unchanged. Driftnet fishing simply does not qualify for dolphin-safe labeling, no matter where it
occurs.
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2.3.2 Dolphin species
Given the emphasis on risk, it was also striking never to see distinctions drawn
between different species of dolphins, their habitats, and population health.
Granted, the parties themselves appear not to have made much of species’ distinc-
tions. But if the US labeling system were to be truly calibrated to the risks that
fishing poses to dolphin populations, the statute or the regulations presumably
would need to take into account differences across species. Yet virtually nothing
in the US labeling regime makes any distinctions between species, their habitats,
or population health. The statute does call for the Secretary of Commerce to
study the ‘depleted dolphin stock’ in the ETP, but other than that single reference –
which itself specifies nothing about species – the legislation says nothing about
particular dolphin stocks. Furthermore, the implementing regulations do not
mention differences in species either, even though other regulatory provisions in
the same part of the US Code of Federal Regulations list specific species of dolphins
as ‘depleted’ and meriting special protection under other regulatory provisions.44
The very existence of mention elsewhere in US law of the biological reality that dif-
ferent types of dolphins face different types of population risks makes plain a
second road not taken by the tribunals: calling out the US failure to make legal dis-
tinctions about species risks. It is hard to see how a regime could ever be said to be
well calibrated to dolphin risks without recognizing biological realities.45
3. Challenges in calibration
The WTO tribunals’ twisting turns and roads not taken are clearly visible from a
risk-based perspective on regulation. Yet, strikingly, risk-based rhetoric itself per-
vaded the various panel decisions throughout theUS–Tuna II dispute, undoubtedly
stemming from several sources. The US, for instance, advanced risk arguments in
defense of its regime. But the pull of a risk logic in this dispute also likely
stemmed from a deep interest in performance-based regulation that infuses the
field of trade and regulation more generally. It is surely no accident that Article
2.8 of the TBT, while not invoked in the tuna dispute, urges WTO members
to draft technical regulations ‘in terms of performance’ whenever possible.
Representatives to the WTO’s TBT Committee ‘have stressed … the advantages
of performance-based regulation’46 and urged that standards as well as regulations
44 E.g., 50 C.F.R. § 216.15.
45 The statute does, of course, give the Secretary of Commerce considerable implementing discretion,
so it is conceivable that in practice the Secretary could put in place some more fine-grained requirements.
But even a Secretary sensitive to and concerned about variation in species’ health would undoubtedly find
the basic structures of the regime – conditions, certifications, and verification – all invariant with respect to
dolphin species.
46WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Compilation of Sources on Good Regulatory
Practice, G/TBT/W/341, 13 September 2011, p. 5.
Risk and Regulatory Calibration 341
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745616000562
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Pennsylvania Libraries, on 19 Apr 2018 at 14:38:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
‘should be performance based rather than based on design or descriptive character-
istics’.47 Throughout the world, we can see considerable interest in stating regula-
tory commands in terms of outcomes (Coglianese, 2016; Hutter, 2016).
Performance-based regulation’s close cousin is what has been widely referred to
as risk-based regulation, which, as its name implies, calls for regulatory decisions to
be based on careful consideration of risk – formally defined as a probability multi-
plied by the severity of a problematic consequence (Paoli andWiles, 2015). Because
any public policy problem can be redefined in terms of the risk of that problem –
that is, either its probability of occurring or its severity – risk-based regulation can
be, and is, viewed as attractive for financial regulation, transportation safety,
homeland security, environmental protection, and any number of other regulatory
domains. Part of risk-based regulation’s appeal stems from its promise to provide
more objective and coherent regulatory decisions. The great advances in risk assess-
ment and analysis in recent decades have, not unreasonably, given rise to expecta-
tions for improved rationality in regulatory decisions.
Rationality is whatWTO dispute settlement bodies purport to assess when trying
to determine whether an otherwise seemingly discriminatory regulation is neverthe-
less based on a sound, objective rationale – as opposed to something ‘arbitrary’.
Rationality can be understood as an alignment between means and ends, a concep-
tion that helps explain the appeal of performance-based regulation. After all, if a
challenged regulation is stated in terms of its ends, rather than means, then it
would be impossible to conclude that the regulation could be arbitrary or unjus-
tified under the TBT Agreement, as long as the ends are permissible ones, such as
‘protection of human, animal or plant life’ as stated in its preamble.
Affinity for performance-based regulation naturally creates an affinity for risk-
based regulation. The mandatory ends that a performance-based regulation
imposes can obviously be stated in terms of risk – or in other outputs related to
risk, such as, say, emissions of pollution. However, even if a regulation is not
defined in terms of a risk-related output or outcome, but instead mandates a
specific means or action, risk-based reasoning can guide the selection of means
that are well-aligned with the underlying risks aiming to be reduced or managed.
Mandated means, in other words, ought to be ‘calibrated’ with desired ends.
When it comes to protecting dolphins, some regulatory theorists might posit a
simpler tuna labeling regime with distinctions based directly on dolphin risks. In
principle, a regulation could simply state that, no matter the means of fishing or
its location, no dolphins can be killed or injured in the harvesting of any tuna
that is to be labeled as dolphin-safe. After all, to have a label state that tuna is
‘dolphin-safe’ is to make a claim about a particular outcome of harvesting:
47WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade,Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the
WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev. 12, 21 January
2015, p. 49.
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namely, safe, unharmed dolphins.48 Such a no-harm labeling rule would offer the
flexibility of performance-based regulation, as it would not say anything about how
tuna can or should be caught, just that whatever means a fishing crew uses, it would
need to maintain the outcome of dolphin safety.
Would such an approach be risk-based as well? In one sense, obviously so. It
would condition labeling on the minimization of any risk to dolphins. But in
another important sense, such a simple law would obscure an important feature of
risk in this context: population risk versus individual risk. Consider, for sake of ana-
lysis, if the US had adopted a flat no-harm ban – not a labeling law, but a ban on
harming any dolphin. Such a ban would maximally protect individual dolphins,
but it would not necessarily be well-calibrated with respect to dolphins’ population
risk. A flat ban on harm to any individual dolphin would be too strict in some parts
of the ocean where dolphins are thriving and the species overall could withstand
harm to some individual dolphins. It could demand too much protection (and too
high a regulatory burden) when not needed from a population standpoint.49
Of course, sometimes laws do impose flat bans. The US Endangered Species Act
bans any harming, taking, and harassing of individual members of species that have
been determined to be threatened or endangered. But such a law affords this indi-
vidual protection only upon a finding that a species is threatened. Absent a condi-
tion of overall species endangerment, a flat ban on harm to individual members of a
species would presumably be out of alignment with population risk. The ideal, per-
fectly calibrated performance-based regulatory standard to manage population risk
would never take the form of a ban on any and all harm to individual dolphins. It
would be a rule written in performance terms with an outcome stated in popula-
tion-risk terms.
As a practical and analytical matter, of course, such an approach would be
infeasible, if not impossible, to carry out. Harm to an individual dolphin can be
observed; the risk of harm to a dolphin population is not directly observable and
cannot be embedded in any enforceable legal obligation or condition. In the real
world, a dolphin species protection law will necessarily be based either on observ-
able means of fishing (e.g., mandating use of fish aggregation devices, prohibiting
driftnets) or on discrete outcomes (that is, bycatch quotas, which in some instances
might need to be zero but in other instances could be greater than that). Either
approach would presumably need to vary depending on the level of viability of
48Of course, a labeling regime does not guarantee safety to dolphins. The label is not mandatory, so
tuna can continue to be caught in ways that harm dolphins as long as the producers are able to and willing
to sell their tuna without the dolphin-safe label. In the widest sense, the ultimate outcome of a perform-
ance-based labeling law is a better-informed consumer, not a protected dolphin.
49 Removing the labeling component of the regulatory regime, a flat ban on harming any dolphins
would come at the cost of tuna as a source of food, as presumably any kind of tuna fishing poses some
unintentional, residual, even de minimis, level of risk of harm to dolphins. To be welfare-maximizing, regu-
lation would not necessarily prevent all harm to dolphins, but just reduce risk to an optimal level, where the
marginal costs of harm prevention equal the marginal benefits.
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fish populations in certain parts of the ocean, as well as vary over time because
species’ viability would undoubtedly change due to levels of fishing as well as
other factors in dolphins’ ecosystems. With perfect information, a resource
manager could issue individual bycatch quotas that would be precisely estimated
and dynamically updated for each location in which a fishing boat might operate.
Perhaps with the assistance of machine learning algorithms, each fishing boat
could receive a precise bycatch limit every day or every week, a limit precisely tar-
geted for its given location and computed to achieve resource management goals.50
Such an approach is not feasible in the world we inhabit today, with its very real
and substantial information costs. But in imagining this way of operationalizing
population risk in terms of perfectly fine-tuned individual-level bycatch quotas,
we can now envision an ideal state that would clearly meet the AB’s test of a
regime where conditions are ‘appropriately tailored to, and commensurate with,
those respective risks’.51 We can also see another, more fundamental problem that
arises if calibration is taken to this extreme: it no longer calls for regulation. The issu-
ance of bycatch permits to individual vessel operatorswould be individualized adjudi-
cations, not a type of general rule-making. Such case-by-case decisions based on
empirical forecasts would be rather the opposite of rules. Rules make general distinc-
tions. They are, by definition, generalizations (Schauer and Zeckhauser, 2007). And
they contain some irreducible level of over- or under-inclusiveness, at least in certain
locations, for some types of behavior, and at particular time periods. Once the
choice is made to create rules, whether as conditions or commands, the distinctions
they contain can never be fully and perfectly ‘calibrated’, for if they were, they
would no longer be regulatory distinctions.
When it comes to ‘calibration’ under Article 2.1, then, there exists no Holy Grail
of precision. The key question should not so much be, ‘Is the regulatory distinction
calibrated?’ The question should be the prior, and more difficult one, namely,
‘How finely calibrated must the regulatory distinction be?’ The answer to this ques-
tion must presumably submit to reason. The important point for our purposes is to
recognize that calibration will be, and necessarily must be, to some degree imprecise
and uncertain with any rule.
When policymakers and scholars go looking for a risk-based approach to regu-
lation, they must understand what they can realistically expect to find. Too seldom
do they appreciate a host of questions that call out for resolution when regulating
risk. Rather than providing a clear, principled guide for regulatory decision
making, a call for risk-based regulation only necessitates making other choices
which hold real policy implications but for which there are often few uncontested,
determinative principles. Worst of all, when advocates of risk-based regulation fail
50 For further discussion of similar, perhaps not-too-fictional, possibilities, see Coglianese and Lehr
(forthcoming).
51 Appellate Body Report, Compliance (Art. 21.5), para. 7.252.
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even to acknowledge these choices, they end up making ad hoc decisions based on
unexamined assumptions.
What are some of these choices that must be resolved, even with risk-based regu-
lation? We offer several major examples.
1. What factors should be taken into account in assessing risks and calibrating them
with regulatory distinctions? Risks are not self-evident. Since risk is a function of
both probability and the severity of harms, these two facets will matter, although
sometimes one may matter more than the other. In some cases, the severity of
harm may matter greatly. For dolphins, the severity of harm was a point of con-
tention throughout the dispute settlement proceeding. Granted, killing is killing,
but dolphins may also be harmed just from the stress of the chase, even if they
receive no visible injury. Of course, severity of harm to a population as
opposed to an individual animal remains a challenging issue to pin down.
Even if the absolute number of dolphins killed is high, this could still be small
relative to the overall population of dolphins. Finally, exposure matters too. As
was uncontested in the proceeding, tuna do not associate with dolphins to the
same extent in every region of the ocean, so the same type of fishing will not
present the same risk exposure to dolphins in different parts of the sea.
2. What principles of risk management should be applied in a risk-based regulatory
regime? Saying that regulation should be based on or calibrated to risk does not
fully explain exactly how risk should enter into a justification for regulation. All
of the following five principles could be applied in a ‘risk-based’ regulatory
regime, but they will not always lead to the same policy outcomes: (a) Prevent
the most severe harm; (b) Minimize risk (i.e., probability times severity of harm);
(c) Avoid unacceptable risk; (d) Control risk only to the extent feasible; and (e)
Maximize net-benefits (i.e., benefits minus costs) (Coglianese, 2015). Does it
matter which of these principles a state chooses for the purpose of even-handedness
or calibration under Article 2.1? Or is it merely that WTO members or the AB (or
both) must articulate some principle and apply it faithfully?
3. What role should administrative and pragmatic concerns play in justifying regu-
latory decisions? Regulators have limited resources, and administrative con-
straints can legitimately affect the design of a regulatory regime. For example,
no regulator can directly oversee every fishing vessel. In addition, there are
costs both to the government and the private sector in imposing observer condi-
tions and other verification and tracking requirements. Should these matter?
Furthermore, regulators may be cognizant of other social or business imperatives
that are likely to affect the behavior of those they oversee: e.g., industry norms,
background liability, consumer pressures. These administrative and pragmatic
considerations cannot be placed into units of risk, but ultimately they may
matter considerably in the design of a regulatory regime (Coglianese, 2002).
4. What to do when uncertainty exists, as it almost always does? Uncertainty is dif-
ferent from risk. Risk has known probabilities, whereas under uncertainty either
the probabilities or outcomes (or both) are not fully known. The compliance AB
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found itself faced with uncertainty, stymied by the contested and incomplete evi-
dence about the relative risks to dolphins from different types of fishing in differ-
ent parts of the ocean. But this was hardly an exceptional predicament.
Uncertainty exists in the real world of policy decision-making all the time. To
be sure, analytic techniques exist to estimate levels of uncertainty, i.e., the confi-
dence we can have in risk estimates (Finkel, 1990). But uncertainty cannot always
be measured consistently or clearly; sometimes regulators are even uncertain
about their uncertainty. What should a WTO body expect in terms of coherence
with respect decision-making under uncertainty? Does uncertainty mean that a
defendant state is justified in regulating just in case (as under the precautionary
principle)? The US argued, after all, that uncertainty over how well the dolphin
population was recovering in the ETP justified its continued distinct treatment of
that region. How can a WTO tribunal determine when a defendant state’s reli-
ance on uncertainty is legitimate?
5. Who bears the burden of demonstrating risk coherence or incoherence? Given
that an inquiry into calibration arises after a determination is made of less favor-
able treatment, calibration is set up as a defense, at least according to the AB’s
analysis. The defendant, then, bears the burden of proof. But there are
broader, related questions. Can a democratic choice by a sovereign state suffice
to meet that burden and provide an acceptable reason for choices about risks?
Is a regulatory distinction legitimate if it is based on a public’s fears, regardless
of whether they are grounded in science? And which institution has the better
knowledge about and ability to assess risks anyway: a nations’ regulator or
WTO panels? Since an inquiry into regulatory distinctions arises after a finding
of less favorable treatment, does it make better sense to give little to no deference
to the defendant state and its regulators?
This last question raises an underlying conundrum about risk and regulatory
calibration at the second step of Article 2.1 analysis. The AB requires that differen-
tial treatment must stem ‘exclusively’ from a legitimate regulatory decision. But
exclusivity raises the bar very high, imposing a potentially impossible practical if
not legal burden of proof on the defendant. It will be hard to demonstrate exclusiv-
ity, for several reasons. First, if a trade differential is working to the disadvantage of
the plaintiff, this will always cast suspicion on what the defendant has done.
Second, the range of risk principles and factors noted above means that domestic
regulators may often (perhaps always) be able to couch their distinctions in the lan-
guage of risk and claim that they are calibrated to risks – even though this does not
mean that those factors are exclusively the reason why the distinctions matter. In
real-world policymaking, there can exist, and probably always will exist, a conflu-
ence of public interested or even-handed rationales and the advancement of private
interests or trade discrimination.52
52 Some economists call this a ‘Baptist-bootlegger’ connection (Smith and Yandle, 2014).
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Issues like these not only make principled regulation difficult, they make prin-
cipled risk-based regulation difficult too. The range of principles, choices, and
factors that underlie even a risk-based approach to regulation also gives reviewing
bodies a considerable number of opportunities to raise factors that either were not
articulated well or never nailed down at all. Moreover, what looks coherent when
some principles or factors are invoked can be made to look incoherent by another
framing (Coglianese, 2002). Absent any fixed, clear guidance, regulatory distinc-
tions might be predictably made to look incoherent.
4. Conclusion
The precision implied by terms like ‘calibration’ or ‘risk-based’ regulation can be
deceptive. Indeed, as suggested in Part II of this article, if the aim of pursuing a
risk-based approach to regulatory review is to achieve a level of principled coherence
in legal decision-making, the experience with theUS–Tuna II proceedings shows that
there are no guarantees against incoherence or ad hoc decision-making. Rather than
a risk-based approach constraining WTO decision-making, it might even reasonably
appear that an emphasis on risk unshackled adjudicators from principled constraints.
As soon as one distinction was addressed, there seemed to be another problematic
one to be found. The roads not taken in the proceeding reinforce the conclusion
that a risk-based approach to decision-making hardly eliminates discretion.
After the compliance proceeding ran its course, the US government yet again
revised its regulatory regime in an effort to adhere to its WTO obligations. It has
done so by attempting to blend the incompatible language that the Article 21.5
AB found objectionable, namely the differences between ‘regular and significant
association’ and ‘regular and significant mortality’. The US regulatory position
would now appear consistent, having addressed the concerns expressed by both
AB decisions. And yet, the question remains: Will what the US has currently
done be enough? That question, we suggest, cannot be definitely answered in the
affirmative. Our review of the US–Tuna II dispute leads us to speculate that, if
further adjudication continues, another Panel might very well return to the issue
and begin again to focus on another set of distinctions or, perhaps, to press that
the US has still not done enough to eliminate the uncertainty over whether its
overall regulatory scheme is truly risk-based.53
In identifying the potential for risk-based rhetoric to disguise ad hoc decision-
making, and in raising questions that must be addressed to make risk-based deci-
sion-making more coherent, we should not be taken to imply that the WTO
dispute settlement process cannot and should not be improved in dealing with
cases like US–Tuna II. On the contrary, calibration, risk analysis, and benefit-
53 By June, 2016, the Dispute Settlement Body had referred the dispute back to a panel for further
Article 21.5 review.
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cost analysis all have the potential to play useful roles both in domestic regulation
and in TBT Article 2.1 cases. But using these concepts and tools to make legal and
policy decisions less arbitrary will require at a minimum that the Appellate Body
provide more careful and coherent guidance to WTO members and to panels
than it has done so far.
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